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ABSTRACT 
Performance Measurement with Loss Aversion* 
We examine a simple measure of portfolio performance based on prospect 
theory, which captures not only risk and return but also reflects differential 
aversion to upside and downside risk. The measure we propose is a ratio of 
gains to losses, with the gains and losses weighted (if desired) to reflect risk-
aversion for gains and risk-seeking for losses. It can also be interpreted as the 
weighted ratio of the value of a call option to a put option, with the benchmark 
as the exercise price. When applying the loss-aversion performance measure 
to closed-end funds, we find that it gives significantly different rankings from 
those of conventional measures (such as the Sharpe ratio, Jensen's alpha, the 
Sortino ratio, and the Higher Moment measure), and gives the expected signs 
for the odd and even moments of tracking errors. However, loss-aversion 
performance is not more closely related to discounts on funds than are the 
conventional performance measures, so we have not found evidence that 
loss-aversion attracts investors to particular funds in the short-term. 
JEL Classification: G11 and G23 
Keywords: closed-end-fund puzzle, loss aversion, performance measurement 
and prospect theory 
Gordon T Gemmill 
City University Business School  
Frobisher Crescent   
Barbican Centre   
LONDON   
EC2Y 8HB   
   
Tel: (44 2476) 52 4542 
Fax: (44 2476) 52 3779  
Email: Gordon.gemmill@wbs.ac.uk 
 
For further Discussion Papers by this author see: 
www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?authorid=105145 
Soosung Hwang 
Faculty of Finance  
Cass Business School   
106 Bunhill Row   
London   
EC1Y 8TZ   
   
Tel: (44 20) 7040 0109  
Fax: (44 20) 7040 8881  
Email: s.hwang@city.ac.uk  
 
For further Discussion Papers by this author see: 
www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?authorid=160694 
Mark Salmon 
Professor of Finance  
Warwick Business School   
Financial Econometrics Research 
Centre   
University of Warwick   
Coventry   
CV4 7AL   
Tel: (44 20) 7657 4168  
Fax: (44 20) 7652 3779  
Email: Mark.Salmon@wbs.ac.uk  
 
For further Discussion Papers by this author see: 
www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?authorid=100353 
 
 
 
Submitted 20 July 2005 
 
 
 2
1 Introduction 
Measures of portfolio performance, which take account both of risk and return, have 
evolved over the years in parallel with asset pricing theory, with the main focus on what 
constitutes risk.  The Sharpe ratio (Sharpe, 1966) comes from portfolio theory and uses 
the variance of returns to measure risk.  Treynor (1965) and Treynor and Mazuy (1966) 
use the CAPM beta as their measure of risk, while Jensen (1968) uses the CAPM alpha.  
Later measures have been based on the APT (Connor and Korajczyk, 1986 and 
Lehmann and Modest, 1987) and the Fama/French model (Carhart, 1997).  Other 
approaches include  the positive period weighting measure (Grinblatt and Titman, 1989) 
and measures based on the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution (Glosten and 
Jagannathan, 1994),  the law of one price and/or no arbitrage (Chen and Knez, 1996), 
and the higher moments of the distribution (Hwang and Satchell, 1998).  
Most of these measures assume that investors maximise expected utility, but this 
paradigm may be criticised for being inconsistent with experimental results. In 
particular, when taking decisions investors consider individual gains and losses rather 
than aggregating them into final wealth and the pleasure from a gain is not as great as 
the regret from a loss of the same size.  This led Kahneman and Tversky (1979) to 
develop prospect theory, according to which investors maximise the weighted sum of a 
value function, where the ‘value function’ is calculated in terms of gains or losses rather 
than final wealth and the ‘weights’ are subjective (rather than objective) probabilities.  
If the gains and losses are measured relative to expectations rather than what happened 
in the recent past, then loss-aversion has been renamed “disappointment aversion” by 
Gul (1991) and this has been implemented by Ang, Bekaert and Liu (2004) and Fielding 
and Stracca (2003), among others.   
The concepts of loss aversion and downside risk have been discussed for a long time by 
both academics and practitioners. Semi-variance, Value-at-Risk and downside beta are 
some well-known examples of downside-risk measures. Professional services such as 
Morningstar and Lipper have developed downside-risk measures to evaluate funds. If 
portfolio allocation is determined by downside risk, then performance measures should 
reflect this. 
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In this paper we propose a new measure of performance based on prospect theory and 
compare it, both theoretically and empirically, with other performance measures.  The 
measure, which we denote as loss-aversion performance (LAP), is the ratio of gains to 
losses, both of which may be weighted by fractional powers. When the reference point 
is the benchmark portfolio, then gains and losses are ‘tracking errors’ and the measure is 
the ratio of positive tracking errors to negative tracking errors, each raised to a power. 1  
Under the special case that both power terms are set to unity, our measure can be 
interpreted as the ratio of the price a call option to the price of a put option and is the 
same as the Omega performance measure of Keating and Shadwick (2002). Omega has 
been developed as an alternative method of presenting distributions of returns, but has 
not been related before to prospect theory.  
The measurement of gains and losses is critical in implementing prospect theory.  An 
interesting feature of investors is that they tend to take greater risks when they have 
experienced recent gains − the so-called ‘house-money effect’ (see, for example, Thaler 
and Johnson, 1990; Barberis, Huang and Santos, 2001).  Because of the house-money 
effect, it is possible that performance measurement should take account of previous 
gains and losses as well as current gains and losses. For example, the poor performance 
of a fund in one period could be compensated to some extent by good performance in a 
previous period, or be regarded as remaining bad if there had been previous losses. Two 
of our three measures of loss-aversion performance allow for the house-money effect, as 
they incorporate lagged performance.   
Using 42 UK closed-end funds, we first show some statistical properties of the LAP 
measure (in three particular specifications) as compared with the Sharpe (1966) ratio, 
Jensen’s (1968) alpha, the Sortino ratio of Sortino and Van der Meer (1991), and the 
higher moment (HM) measure of Hwang and Satchell (1998). The new loss-aversion 
performance measures give different rankings from those of the conventional measures, 
but we do not find any significant differences between the three LAP variants and so 
conclude that the house-money effect is not relevant in our sample. Our results support 
                                                 
1 Tracking error is defined in different ways in different studies. For example, Pope and Yadav (1994), 
Lee (1998), and Rudolf, Wolter and Zimmermann (1999) define tracking error as standard deviation of 
the difference between portfolio returns and benchmark returns, while Clarke, Krase, and Statman (1994), 
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the use of loss-aversion measures of performance. In particular these measures have 
highly desirable properties such as a positive relationship with a fund’s tracking error 
and a negative relationship with its kurtosis. Other standard measures such as Jensen’s 
alpha, the Sortino ratio, and the HM do not have these properties.  
We also examine whether measures of performance can explain the discount on closed-
end funds. If a performance measure is capturing what investors want, then it might be 
expected that the discount would be smaller for funds which “perform” well by that 
measure. We find that there is no simple relationship between discounts and any of the 
performance measures (traditional or otherwise) for the funds in our sample, so investor 
sentiment is not adequately captured in this way.  
The paper is written as follows.  In section 2 we develop the loss-aversion performance 
measure which is consistent with prospect theory.  We also describe the alternative 
measures for performance which exist.  In section 3 we compare the behaviour of LAP 
with the other measures empirically, using a set of monthly data on closed-end funds 
from May 1993 to April 2002.  In section 4 we test whether LAP is more consistent 
with investor preferences than the other measures, assuming that such preferences are 
reflected in the discount on a particular fund.  Section 5 draws together the conclusions 
of the study.   
 
2  Performance Measures with Loss Aversion 
2.1  Prospect Theory and Loss Aversion 
According to prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979),  decisions are based upon 
relative gains and losses rather than upon the final wealth level (which is the key 
objective in conventional expected utility theory).  Let Wt be the wealth of an investor at 
time t and let Bt be some appropriate benchmark wealth at time t relative to which an 
                                                                                                                                               
Roll (1992) define tracking error as difference between portfolio returns and the benchmark portfolio 
returns. In this study we follow the second definition. 
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investor measures gains and losses. Gains are then measured as Xt, with Xt=Wt−Bt.  The 
value function, VS, is defined as 
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where the parameters v1, v2 and λ  are assumed positive. The two terms in (1) are 
respectively: gains raised to the power v1;  and losses raised to the power v2 multiplied 
by a relative loss aversion coefficient λ.  
Figure 1 plots the value function against losses and gains.  Loss-aversion is generated 
by having λ>1, which leads to the kink at the origin of the diagram. Kahneman  and 
Tversky (1992) and Benartzi and Thaler (1995), use λ = 2.25, while Ang, Bekeart, and 
Liu (2004) use a range of λ values which exceed unity and Fishburn and Kochenberger 
(1979) also present some evidence that λ > 1.       
Figure 1    The Value Function VS in Prospect Theory (with λ =2.25) 
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When v1= v2=1, the investor is risk-neutral with respect to gain or losses and this is 
shown as the dotted line in Figure 1.  In the case originally suggested by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979), there is risk-aversion in gains (v1 <1) and risk-seeking in losses (v2 <1), 
which is shown as the solid line in Figure 1. 
 
2.2  Loss Aversion with a ‘House Money’ Effect 
We take account of two (of the many) extensions to prospect theory.  First, risk-seeking 
(convexity, v2 <1) over losses is not generally supported; it is observed only when 
decision makers are asked to choose among prospects that involve only losses or gains, 
but not both. In other words, it is displayed if the frame of reference is one in which the 
investor cannot avoid making a loss.  Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) argue that for 
the choice of prospects that include both gains and losses, a loss aversion coefficient 
that is larger than one is the most important feature and so they set the two curvature 
parameters to unity. 2 Levy and Levy (2002), using stochastic dominance theory and 
experiments, also conclude that investors are not generally risk-loving over losses but 
are more likely to exhibit risk-aversion in both the gain and loss domains. 
Second, investors who are “sitting on” prior gains may exhibit less pain for losses than 
those who are sitting on prior losses. The ‘house-money effect’ suggests that the value 
of λ should be smaller if there have been recent gains, an approach taken by Barberis, 
Huang and Santos (2001) in their study of the equity risk-premium.   
To take account of the house-money effect and possible risk-aversion over losses, we 
propose two variants of the basic value function.  In the first variant, which we call VH 
(where superscrip H denotes “house-money”), we follow Barberis, Huang and Santos 
(2001) and make the loss-aversion coefficient λ depend on the previous gains and 
losses:  
                                                 
2 In fact, when the two curvature parameters are set to any value close to one (e.g., 0.88), the degree of 
curvature is very small. 
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where 110 −−= tt Xββλ , 00 >β , and 01 >β .  Therefore with previous losses (i.e., 
01 <−tX ) we have 0βλ >t  and hence the investor is more averse to losses, and vice 
versa.   
In the second variant, we dispose of the two parameters v1 and v2 and replace λt by 
)exp( tt Xρ− .  The revised function is an ‘exponentially weighted loss aversion’ 
function, VEW, which is defined as 
          ttt
EW XXV )exp( ρ−= , (3)
where 110 −−= tt Xψψρ , 00 >ψ  and 01 >ψ . In this case there is no longer a sharp kink 
at zero in the value function. This is not as radical as it appears, because the “knife-
edge” distinction between gains and losses around zero requires all investors to have the 
same benchmark. In financial markets there are many different choices of market 
indices for the benchmark. Although these are highly correlated, some small differences 
are inevitable and a small loss calculated with one index may be a small gain with 
another index.  Figure 2 shows that for ρ = 5 or ρ = 10 the investor is assumed to be 
risk-averse in both the gain and loss domains, but the value function exhibits a smooth 
transition to be steeper in the loss domain, preserving loss-aversion.  
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Figure 2     Value Functions with Exponential Weights 
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2.3  Loss-Aversion Risk Measures 
We have already argued that the benchmark will depend on the choice of a particular 
index.  For portfolio managers it is sensible to calculate gains and losses at the present 
time as wealth in the previous period scaled-up by the rate of return on the risky index.  
The benchmark wealth for gains and losses is then Wt−1(1+rbt), where Wt−1 is wealth in 
the previous period and  rbt is the rate of return on the benchmark asset at time t. 
Gains or losses from investing in a portfolio can then be expressed relative to the 
benchmark as: 
          ,1 )-r(rWX btptt-t =   
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where rpt is the portfolio return at time t. The prospect-theory value function in (1) can 
then be re-written using the benchmark as: 
          ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ,2211 11 vbtptvtvbtptvtS rrWrrWV −−+− −−−−= λ  (4)
where superscripts + and − represent conditional gains and losses respectively. Thus for 
fund managers, the objective is to maximise the expected value function: 
          ]))-r(rE[(pW-]))-rpE[((r W]E[V vbtpt
v
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v
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S 2211 )1(11
−+ −−= λ , (5)
where )0( ≥−= btpt rrprobp  and the expectation operator is calculated with subjective 
weights rather than with an objective probability density function.3 
Viewed in this way, the expected value function in equation (5) is not conceptually very 
different from that used in traditional risk-return analysis.  The first term on the right-
hand side is what investors want, while the second term is what they want to avoid. 4  
The trade-off between the two is reflected in λ , the loss-aversion coefficient.   By 
comparison, a traditional mean-variance expected utility is: 
           ,2
prMVp
σ-]E[rE[u] λ=   
where  MVλ  is a measure of risk-aversion and 2prσ is the variance of returns on the 
portfolio.  
In fact, the expectation on the second component in (5), ]))-r(rE[(p vbp 2)1(
−−− , is a 
special case of the risk measure suggested by Fishburn (1977). His measure is  
          [ ] ,)(,, ∫ −=
∞−
τ
ττ
r
pp
v
ppF drrfrrrvrR  (6)
                                                 
3 According to prospect theory, people are observed to over-weight outcomes that are unlikely and under-
weight outcomes that are highly likely. However, this subjective weighting function is not known and 
controversial. We do not consider the issue of subjective weights here.  
4 For simplicity, we omit the time subscript t where it is not required. 
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which includes the variance and semi-variance as special cases (in addition to standard 
deviation and semi-standard deviation). Using the objective probability density function, 
we can express the second component of (5) as 
          [ ].,,
)()1(
2
22
pbF
r
pp
v
pb
v
bp
rvrR
drrfrr]))-r(rE[(p
b
=
−=−− ∫
∞−
−
 (7)
The difference between Fishburn’s measure and our loss-aversion risk measure is that 
we allow any positive real number for v2. 5  
 
2.4  Loss-Averse Performance Measures 
As already noted, the first component in (5) represents what investors want (reward) and 
the second component is what they wish to avoid (risk).  A simple loss-averse 
performance measure is then the ratio of the two,   
 
          
]))-r(rE[(p
]))-rpE[((r
LAP v
bp
v
bpS
2
1
)1( −
+
−−= . (10)
Notice that the coefficient λ drops out, just as MVλ  is not required in the Sharpe ratio, 
because it is a constant. An important special case arises when the return on a risky 
benchmark portfolio is used. When we can define TE≡rp−rb, which is tracking error, and 
the simple loss aversion performance can be re-written as: 
                                                 
5 The loss aversion risk measure does not belong to so-called ''coherent risk measures''. See Embrechts, 
Klüppelberg, and Mikosch (1997) and Artzner (1999) for a discussion.  
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The calculation of ])E[(TE v1+  and ])TEE[( v2−−  as well as p=prob(TE>0) requires 
an assumption on the probability density function (pdf) of tracking errors. Unfortunately 
the properties of tracking errors are not known, and even if rp and rb are normally 
distributed this does not imply that the tracking errors will be Gaussian. In the empirical 
tests below we use non-parametric methods (i.e. the empirical distributions) to 
overcome this difficulty.6 
When the house-money effect is taken into account, the loss aversion coefficient tλ  is a 
function of previous performance and does not drop out. The revised performance 
measure becomes   
          ,
)1( 2
1
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where 110 −−= tt TEββλ , 00 >β , and 01 ≥β . Likewise, the performance measure with 
exponential weights can be written as 
          ,
)(exp()1(
exp(
]TE)TEE[p
])TETEpE[LAP
ttt
tttEW
−−
++
−−−
−= ρ
ρ  (13)
where 110 −−= tt TEψψρ , 00 >ψ , and 01 ≥ψ . 
The interpretation of these performance measures with the house-money effect is as 
follows. When there are losses in the previous period ( 01 <−tTE ), the loss aversion 
coefficient tλ  becomes larger and thus LAPH shows worse performance than the 
                                                 
6 We could assume a specific pdf for the calculation of the SLAP ; for example, Hwang and Satchell 
(2005) use Gaussian and mixed Gamma distributions. The mixed Gamma distribution is useful since it 
allows asymmetry and fat tails, while Gaussianity does not. In addition, the mixed Gamma distribution 
provides convenient analytical results for the SLAP . We find that the SLAP  calculated with the non-
parametric values of ]1[
v
)(TEE +  and ]2[ v)TE(E −−  are very close to those with the mixed Gamma 
distribution. The results with the assumption of the pdfs can be obtained from authors.  
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simpler LAPS of (10). Therefore previous losses of a fund affect the current evaluation 
of the fund in a negative way.  
Figure 3 demonstrates the conceptual simplicity of LAPS , with the benchmark return 
set at B.  (Note that for an absolute-return fund, such as a hedge fund,  the benchmark 
might be set at, say, 5% per annum rather than as the return on an index.)  LAPS is equal 
to the probability of gains, p, times the expected (fractionally powered) gains of XG, 
divided by the probability of losses, 1-p, times the expected (fractionally powered) 
losses of XL.   
When v1=v2=1, then LAPS is equivalent to Keating and Shadwick’s (2002) Omega.  We 
can also note how pXG is equal in value to an outperformance call option (relative to the 
benchmark, exercise price, B) and (1-p)XL is equal in value to an underperformance put 
at the same exercise price.  If the distribution of excess returns were normal, then the 
values of these options could be easily computed with the Black/Scholes formula.7 
 
                                                 
7 Given the ouperformance character of these options, there are two stochastic variables to take into 
account – the current portfolio and the benchmark portfolio. Consequently a model which allows for this 
becomes necessary, such as that of Margrabe (1978). 
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Figure 3 The Distribution of Returns and the Elements of the Simple Loss-Averse 
Performance Measure, LAPS 
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2.5  Other Performance Measures 
Turning to other measures of performance for comparison, the Sharpe (1966) ratio is 
simply the reward per unit of total variability: 
          ,
p
fp
σ
)-r E(r
SR =  (8)
where σp is the standard deviation of portfolio returns. The measure is easy to 
understand and widely used.  
The Sortino ratio (Sortino and Van der Meer (1991)) changes the Sharpe ratio by 
measuring risk as deviations below the benchmark: 
 14
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where the numerator is the same as that of the Sharpe ratio, but the denominator is 
replaced with semi-standard-deviation. 
Using tracking errors can cause a serious problem for the Sharpe and Sortino ratios 
when ranking funds.8  This is because if average tracking errors are around zero, these 
performance measures calculated with tracking errors could be negative for some funds. 
There is no simple way around this problem and so Sharpe and Sortino ratios are used 
in this study with a benchmark of the risk-free rate rather than in tracking-error form.  9 
Jensen’s (1968) alpha, αpJ, measures performance of a portfolio which is not explained 
by its CAPM beta:  
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and rp represents the portfolio's return, rf is the risk-free rate, rm is the market 
(benchmark) return, βp denotes the systematic risk of the portfolio. The measure is 
based on the assumptions that returns are Gaussian and investors have a quadratic utility 
function. When these assumptions do not hold Jensen’s alpha is not appropriate. 
                                                 
8 The Sharpe ratio is known as the information ratio when measured as outperformance, see Gupta, 
Prajobi and Stubbs (1999). 
9 Using tracking errors, we would rank a fund whose average value and standard deviation of tracking 
errors are –0.1% and 2% respectively (the Sharpe ratio is –0.05) higher than a fund whose average value 
and standard deviation of tracking error are –0.1% and 1% respectively (the Sharpe ratio is –0.1). 
However, because of the first fund’s high volatility, it has higher probability of larger negative tracking 
errors, and for any risk-averse investor this fund would not be preferred to the second.  A similar problem 
arises for the Sortino ratio. 
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A higher moment (HM) measure has been proposed by Hwang and Satchell (1998), 
based on an extension of the CAPM to three moments. It is 
          )(21 ppmp
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Note that γm and θm are the skewness and kurtosis of the market return, and βp and γp are 
beta and coskewness, respectively. If the market returns are normal or investors’ utility 
is governed by the mean and variance only, then ψ1= βp and ψ2=0 and thus HMpα  is 
equivalent to Jensen's Alpha. If this is not the case, the measure reflects both the 
skewness and kurtosis of the distribution of returns. 
Jensen’s alpha uses beta as risk measure while the higher moment (HM) performance 
measure uses beta and co-skewness as risk measures. Note that when beta is close to 
one (as in most mutual funds) Jensen’s alpha becomes similar to average tracking error. 
Similarly, when co-skewness is small the HM measure is not different from average 
tracking error. It is beta and co-skewness respectively that could make these two 
performance measures different from average tracking error.  
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There are two other performance measures which we have considered.  They are the 
Treynor and Mazuy (TM) (1966) measure and the positive period weighting (PPW) 
measure of Grinblatt and Titman (1989).  However, we find that these two measures 
give virtually identical results to Jensen’s alpha and so we do not include them.10   We 
have also not included the commercial measures of downside risk used by Morningstar 
and Lipper.  Until the middle of 2002 Morningstar had a measure which compared a 
fund’s average underperformance in months when it underperformed with a similar 
measure for its category.  This measure has been abandoned because many new funds in 
the late 1990s never underperformed relative to the benchmark.  Lipper has a measure 
for the “preservation of capital” which is just the sum of negative monthly returns over 
3, 5 and 10 year periods.  A review of these and other industry measures may be found 
in Amenc and Le Sourd (2005).  
 
3  Empirical Tests 
3.1  Objectives and Data 
In this section we compare the three LAP measures with the four conventional 
performance measures in an empirical context.  The aim is to discover whether there is 
any difference in the rankings of funds when using alternative measures.  If there is not, 
then the simplest possible measure should be adopted and there is no benefit of being 
concerned with loss aversion. 
The analysis is based on two groups of UK closed-end funds which have very clear 
benchmarks: the first group of 19 funds has a benchmark of the FTSE AllShare index, 
and the second group of 23 funds has a benchmark of the FTSE SmallCap index.  By 
using two groups, we are able to investigate the properties of the performance measures 
in different markets and also to cross-compare closed-end funds in different groups. The 
data are monthly over the period May 1993 to April 2002 and retrieved from 
Datastream. The analysis is made on net-asset values (NAVs) rather than prices, 
                                                 
10 Cumby and Glen (1990), Grinblatt and Titman (1994), Hwang and Satchell (1998) and Hwang and 
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because managers are evaluated on that basis. Tracking errors are calculated by taking 
the returns of the benchmark from the returns of the individual closed-end funds’ NAVs.   
Although the total of 42 funds which we use in this study is relatively small, that should 
not matter for discovering whether measures differ sufficiently to have an empirically 
recognisable impact.   
Table 1 reports the basic statistical properties of the monthly returns for the 42 UK 
closed-end funds and two benchmark indices over the sample period. For the closed-end 
funds whose benchmark is the FTSE AllShare index (AllShare group), mean returns 
range from 0.7% to 1.2% (8.4% to 14.4% in annual terms) with standard deviations 
between 1.5% and 7.3% (5.2% to 25.3% in annual terms). The SmallCap funds show 
returns in the 0.2% to 1.6% range per month (2.4% to 19.2% in annual terms) and 
standard deviations between 3% and 8.6% (10.4% to 29.8%  in annual terms).  
 
                                                                                                                                               
Salmon (2002) also find these measures to be similar.  
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Table 1 Properties of Net Asset Value Returns and Their Tracking Errors           
                     
A. FTSE AllShare Index Funds                  
    NAV Log-returns        Tracking Errors 
Benchmark Portfolio 
and Investment Trusts Mean Std. Dev. 
Skewn
ess Kurtosis 
Normality 
(Jarque-
Bera) 
Autocorrel
ation with 
Lag 1 
Mean Std. Dev. 
Skewn
ess 
Kurtosi
s 
Normality 
(Jarque-
Bera) 
Autocorrela
tion with 
Lag 1 
Rank 
Correlations 
between 
NAV log-
returns and 
Tracking 
Errors 
Disco
unts 
FTSE AllShare index 0.008 0.038 -0.689 0.515 9.738 * -0.008                     
  Albany 0.009 0.035 -0.542 0.242 5.555 * -0.061  0.001 0.014 0.494 0.095 4.432 * -0.123  -0.034   0.157 
  Bankers 0.009 0.040 -0.986 2.015 35.792 * -0.052  0.001 0.014 -0.202 0.087 0.767  -0.067  0.260 * 0.059 
  Capital Gearing 0.009 0.021 -0.425 0.794 6.088 * -0.055  0.001 0.028 0.433 -0.059 3.397  -0.076  -0.131   0.051 
  City Of London 0.009 0.042 -0.771 1.095 16.094 * -0.038  0.001 0.012 0.173 1.735 14.082 * 0.210 * 0.407 * 0.015 
  Dres.Rcm Endow 0.007 0.015 1.827 5.270 185.069 * -0.209 * -0.001 0.040 0.582 0.091 6.130 * -0.085  0.129   0.004 
  Edinburgh 0.007 0.042 -0.715 0.918 12.998 * 0.014  -0.001 0.010 0.404 0.935 6.871 * -0.098  0.492 * 0.121 
  Edinburgh UK Tracker 0.008 0.038 -0.584 0.283 6.489 * -0.021  0.000 0.006 1.294 1.455 39.676 * -0.268 * 0.035   0.007 
  F&C Pep 0.008 0.037 -0.967 1.393 25.576 * 0.042  0.000 0.013 0.723 0.083 9.448 * 0.088  0.041   0.067 
  Finsbury Growth 0.008 0.046 -0.768 0.961 14.787 * -0.039  0.000 0.016 -0.114 0.099 0.277  -0.119  0.597 * 0.103 
  Fleming Claverhouse 0.009 0.044 -0.667 0.671 10.039 * 0.013  0.001 0.012 -0.413 1.366 11.465 * 0.012  0.650 * -0.010 
  Glasgow Income 0.011 0.046 -1.182 2.591 55.342 * -0.043  0.003 0.025 0.131 1.090 5.655 * 0.042  0.545 * 0.047 
  Henderson Elec.&Gen. 0.007 0.052 -0.333 0.944 6.002 * 0.100  -0.001 0.030 0.388 3.574 60.192 * 0.209 * 0.598 * 0.090 
  Law Debenture 0.010 0.040 -0.976 1.701 30.156 * -0.036  0.002 0.015 0.657 1.131 13.515 * 0.028  0.268 * -0.093 
  Lowland 0.011 0.049 -1.166 4.011 96.897 * 0.029  0.003 0.031 0.635 6.099 174.644 * 0.092  0.541 * 0.078 
  Merchants 0.010 0.045 -0.964 1.813 31.521 * -0.074  0.002 0.021 0.231 0.623 2.704  0.078  0.513 * 0.057 
  Murray Income 0.009 0.040 -0.898 1.624 26.377 * 0.051  0.001 0.017 1.478 5.811 191.276 * 0.370 * 0.239 * 0.074 
  Securities Tst.Sctl. 0.007 0.041 -0.802 1.186 17.904 * -0.035  -0.001 0.015 0.337 0.056 2.058  -0.114  0.304 * 0.095 
  Temple Bar 0.010 0.041 -0.599 1.722 19.810 * 0.016  0.002 0.019 1.039 2.158 40.383 * 0.213 * 0.253 * 0.049 
  Welsh Industrial 0.012 0.073 2.346 14.780 1082.008 * -0.011  0.003 0.063 3.156 18.377 1699.059 * 0.095   0.516 * 0.235 
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B. FTSE Small Cap Index Funds                  
NAV Log-returns Tracking Errors 
Benchmark Portfolio 
and Investment Trusts Mean Std. Dev. 
Skewne
ss Kurtosis 
Normality 
(Jarque-
Bera) 
Autocorrela
tion with 
Lag 1 
Mean Std. Dev. 
Skewne
ss 
Kurto
sis 
Normality 
(Jarque-
Bera) 
Autocorrelat
ion with Lag 
1 
Rank 
Correlations 
between NAV 
log-returns 
and Tracking 
Errors 
Disco
unts 
FTSE Small Cap 0.007 0.049 -1.148 4.464 113.398 * 0.181                      
  3i Sm.Quoted 0.008 0.056 -1.063 2.650 51.943 * 0.190   0.001 0.020 -0.731 2.499 37.718 * 0.091   0.511 * 0.132 
  Aberforth 0.013 0.046 -0.688 1.731 21.996 * 0.163   0.006 0.024 0.086 2.163 21.190 * 0.298 * 0.202 * 0.055 
  Britannic 0.007 0.052 -0.984 3.151 62.083 * 0.204 * 0.000 0.017 -0.480 2.832 40.237 * 0.193   0.236 * 0.136 
  Candover 0.016 0.038 3.492 17.584 1610.908 * -0.162   0.009 0.061 1.535 4.477 132.583 * 0.003   0.212 * -0.030 
  Dresdner Rcm 0.008 0.071 -0.112 3.107 43.667 * 0.352 * 0.001 0.038 1.102 8.355 335.979 * 0.443 * 0.634 * 0.172 
  Dunedin Enterprise 0.011 0.030 0.238 3.485 55.671 * 0.203 * 0.004 0.056 0.237 2.349 25.836 * 0.092   0.324 * 0.164 
  Dunedin Smaller 0.009 0.055 -1.176 4.312 108.586 * 0.207 * 0.002 0.022 -0.129 0.919 4.101 * 0.109   0.382 * 0.148 
  Electra 0.010 0.035 -0.339 4.993 114.244 * 0.039   0.003 0.039 0.184 0.690 2.755  -0.058   -0.024   0.151 
  Fleming Mercantile 0.010 0.047 -0.622 2.747 40.920 * 0.171   0.003 0.020 0.269 0.492 2.386  -0.044   0.152   0.150 
  Fleming 0.009 0.059 -0.951 3.208 62.599 * 0.243 * 0.002 0.024 -0.014 2.684 32.417 * 0.227 * 0.456 * 0.120 
  Gartmore 0.006 0.059 -0.618 2.406 32.933 * 0.343 * -0.001 0.031 -0.342 3.287 50.716 * 0.383 * 0.420 * 0.152 
  Govett Strategic 0.007 0.051 -0.736 1.862 25.354 * 0.086   0.001 0.023 -0.406 1.081 8.230 * -0.014   0.345 * 0.148 
  Henderson 0.002 0.078 -0.790 2.779 45.979 * 0.215 * -0.005 0.051 -1.040 5.768 169.144 * 0.202 * 0.580 * 0.125 
  Henderson Strata 0.007 0.072 -0.444 2.521 32.150 * 0.268 * 0.000 0.047 -0.398 4.709 102.622 * 0.248 * 0.516 * 0.047 
  I&S.UK. 0.009 0.059 -0.530 1.539 15.718 * 0.259 * 0.002 0.030 -0.665 4.856 114.075 * 0.246 * 0.440 * 0.149 
  Invesco Eng.& Intl. 0.010 0.075 -0.798 3.991 83.154 * 0.239 * 0.004 0.037 0.315 5.661 145.994 * 0.297 * 0.824 * 0.133 
  Mercury Grosvenor 0.011 0.036 -0.435 5.080 119.553 * 0.015   0.004 0.053 0.305 3.611 60.348 * 0.046   0.262 * 0.178 
  Northern Investors 0.011 0.037 2.887 18.643 1714.135 * 0.101   0.004 0.051 1.004 2.311 42.177 * 0.092   0.208 * 0.166 
  Pantheon Intl. 0.011 0.039 2.985 16.356 1364.287 * -0.109   0.004 0.058 1.287 3.353 80.419 * 0.041   0.348 * 0.188 
  Perpetual UK  0.012 0.049 -1.089 3.961 91.922 * 0.194   0.005 0.017 -0.259 1.627 13.115 * 0.045   0.126 * 0.097 
  Shires 0.009 0.048 -0.895 2.200 36.204 * 0.128   0.002 0.021 -0.130 1.954 17.493 * -0.082   0.217 * 0.121 
  Thompson Clive 0.011 0.086 1.679 8.063 343.309 * 0.116   0.004 0.078 1.385 4.947 144.661 * 0.085   0.646 * 0.195 
  Throgmorton 0.006 0.052 -0.932 2.723 49.004 * 0.149   -0.001 0.018 -0.199 0.595 2.305   0.056   0.356 * 0.146 
Notes: A total number of 108 monthly log-returns from May 1993 to April 2002 is used to calculate the statistics in the table. Tracking errors are calculated by taking appropriate benchmark 
portfolio log-returns from investment trust log-returns. The stars in the normality test and autocorrelation coefficient represent significance at the 5% level. 
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Most NAV returns (left half of Table 1) are negatively skewed and leptokurtic, leading 
to significant non-normality according to the Jarque-Bera statistics.  In particular, the 
SmallCap NAV returns are more leptokurtic than those of the AllShare group. The non-
normality suggests that performance-measures based on mean and variance may not 
capture downside risk satisfactorily. Another result in Table 1 is that in several cases 
high autocorrelation coefficients are found for funds in the SmallCap group, which may 
be due to the illiquidity of the small stocks which they hold.      
The right-hand side of Table 1 reports the statistical properties of the tracking errors.  
For the AllShare group most of these tracking errors have means which are close to zero, 
as expected, but for the SmallCap group 20 of the 23 means are positive.  By contrast, 
16 out of 19 of the AllShare group show positive skewness, whereas only 11 out of 23 
of the SmallCap group are positively skewed.   
The results in Table 1 suggest that the distributions of the tracking errors are different 
from those of NAV returns. In particular, they tend to show less skewness and kurtosis 
than raw returns.  Because of the non-normality for almost all distributions, Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient may not be an appropriate tool to analyse the dependence 
relationships. For this reason we prefer to use Spearman’s rank order correlations.  The 
rank correlation coefficients between NAV returns and the tracking errors (penultimate 
column of Table 1) are positive and significant on average, but the levels are quite 
varied (ranging from –0.131 to +0.824).  More than two thirds of the coefficients are 
less than 0.5. This suggests that performance based on tracking errors is likely to be 
quite different from that based on NAV returns. 
Finally, the last column of Table 1 shows that during the nine years in our sample, 39 of 
the 42 funds traded on average at discounts to their NAVs.  
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Table 2  Performance Measures for the UK Investment Trusts 
A. Performance Measures for the AllShare Group 
Sharpe Ratio 
Jensen's Alpha 
(Multiplied by 
100) 
Sortino Ratio 
Higher Moment 
(Multiplied by 
100) 
LAPS (v1=0.75, 
v2=0.95) 
 
Values WG AG Values WG AG Values WG AG Values WG AG Values WG AG
Albany 0.134 6 14 0.166 8 21 0.546 6 8 0.167 13 26 2.780 5 9 
Bankers 0.109 10 18 0.085 11 28 0.467 9 11 0.306 9 21 2.759 6 10 
Capital Gearing 0.230 1 2 0.344 2 11 0.270 15 22 0.451 6 14 2.244 13 26 
City Of London 0.109 11 19 0.082 12 29 0.572 3 5 0.172 12 25 2.934 3 6 
Dres.Rcm 
Endow 0.152 2 8 0.219 6 18 0.085 19 38 0.286 11 24 1.713 18 40 
Edinburgh 0.051 18 36 -0.166 19 41 0.298 14 20 -0.105 19 40 1.698 19 41 
Edinburgh Uk 
Tracker 0.086 15 25 -0.021 15 35 0.927 1 1 -0.048 17 34 2.194 14 28 
F&C Pep & Isa 0.102 13 22 0.051 14 32 0.481 8 10 0.300 10 22 2.349 11 23 
Finsbury Growth 0.074 16 28 -0.069 16 37 0.299 13 19 0.087 16 31 2.311 12 25 
Fleming 
Claverhouse 0.108 12 20 0.080 13 30 0.570 4 6 0.146 14 28 3.160 2 4 
Glasgow Income 0.135 5 13 0.260 3 14 0.415 10 12 0.672 3 7 2.731 7 12 
Henderson 
Elec.&Gen. 0.045 19 38 -0.162 18 40 0.113 18 37 -0.093 18 38 1.808 17 39 
Law Debenture 0.137 4 12 0.204 7 20 0.656 2 3 0.462 5 13 3.240 1 3 
Lowland 0.124 7 15 0.257 4 15 0.321 12 17 0.688 1 5 2.479 10 19 
Merchants 0.111 9 17 0.131 9 24 0.370 11 15 0.463 4 12 2.520 9 18 
Murray Income 0.115 8 16 0.122 10 25 0.481 7 9 0.405 7 15 2.618 8 15 
Securities 
Tst.Sctl. 0.068 17 31 -0.077 17 38 0.268 16 23 0.111 15 29 1.989 15 33 
Temple Bar 0.138 3 11 0.226 5 17 0.551 5 7 0.349 8 16 2.799 4 7 
Welsh Industrial 0.094 14 23 0.355 1 10 0.227 17 27 0.686 2 6 1.930 16 36 
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B. Performance Measures for the SmallCap Group 
Sharpe Ratio 
Jensen's Alpha 
(Multiplied by 
100) 
Sortino Ratio 
Higher Moment 
(Multiplied by 
100) 
LAPS (v1=0.75, 
v2=0.95) 
 
Values WG AG Values WG AG Values WG AG Values WG AG Values WG AG
3i Sm.Quoted 0.059 16 33 0.089 16 26 0.230 9 25 0.154 14 27 2.584 8 16 
Aberforth 0.174 4 5 0.612 2 2 0.602 2 4 0.608 6 9 4.125 2 2 
Britannic 0.051 19 37 0.039 19 33 0.220 12 29 0.066 16 32 2.479 10 20 
Candover 0.292 1 1 1.112 1 1 0.380 4 14 1.248 1 1 2.574 9 17 
Dresdner Rcm 0.052 18 35 0.089 17 27 0.158 18 35 -0.063 18 35 2.185 16 30 
Dunedin 
Enterprise 0.195 2 3 0.582 5 5 0.160 17 34 0.789 3 3 2.153 17 31 
Dunedin Smaller 0.070 13 29 0.154 15 23 0.271 7 21 0.323 10 18 2.636 7 14 
Electra 0.163 6 7 0.477 8 8 0.230 10 26 0.743 4 4 2.352 12 22 
Fleming 
Mercantile 0.106 9 21 0.303 10 12 0.406 3 13 0.312 12 20 3.068 3 5 
Fleming 0.078 11 26 0.208 13 19 0.300 6 18 0.287 13 23 2.788 4 8 
Gartmore 0.029 21 40 -0.062 21 36 0.075 21 40 -0.095 21 39 1.977 19 34 
Govett Strategic 0.055 17 34 0.069 18 31 0.170 16 33 0.088 15 30 2.344 13 24 
Henderson -0.037 23 42 -0.568 23 42 -0.070 23 42 -0.588 23 42 1.372 23 42 
Henderson Strata 0.034 20 39 -0.009 20 34 0.071 22 41 -0.075 20 37 1.955 20 35 
I&S.UK. 0.066 15 32 0.155 14 22 0.174 15 32 -0.004 17 33 2.448 11 21 
Invesco Eng.& 
Intl. 0.077 12 27 0.262 11 13 0.238 8 24 0.316 11 19 2.668 6 13 
Mercury 
Grosvenor 0.173 5 6 0.583 4 4 0.186 14 31 0.498 8 11 2.237 14 27 
Northern 
Investors 0.178 3 4 0.604 3 3 0.225 11 28 0.813 2 2 2.193 15 29 
Pantheon Intl. 0.152 7 9 0.571 6 6 0.188 13 30 0.651 5 8 2.014 18 32 
Perpetual UK  0.148 8 10 0.510 7 7 0.722 1 2 0.599 7 10 4.743 1 1 
Shires 0.090 10 24 0.234 12 16 0.322 5 16 0.327 9 17 2.733 5 11 
Thompson Clive 0.068 14 30 0.413 9 9 0.129 19 36 -0.071 19 36 1.846 22 38 
Throgmorton 0.019 22 41 -0.123 22 39 0.075 20 39 -0.121 22 41 1.906 21 37 
 
Notes: The performance measures were calculated with 108 monthly log-returns from May 1993 to April 
2002. The numbers in the column 'WG' are ranks within the AllShare or SmallCap group and the numbers 
in the column 'AG' represent ranks among all 42 investment trusts. LAPS is the simple loss aversion 
performance measure without the house money effect. 
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3.2  Cross-sectional Properties of Loss Aversion Performance Measures 
In Table 2 we report the LAPS (with v1=0.75 and v2=0.95) 11 and the four other 
performance measures over the 108 monthly returns.   There are three columns for each 
measure:  the first, labelled ‘values’, gives the performance for the sample period;  the 
second, labelled ‘WG’, gives the rank of a particular fund “within” its style group; and 
the third, labelled ‘AG’, gives the rank of a fund across “all” style groups.  
Beginning with values,  the Sharpe ratios and Sortino ratios are all positive except in 
one case.   This is to be expected as they measure returns in excess of the risk-free rate 
rather than over the benchmark.  The values for Jensen’s alpha and the higher-moment 
measure are close to zero, as they measure returns relative to the benchmark index.  The 
LAPS values range from 1.4 to 4.7, indicating that the gain component in the numerator 
of equation (10) exceeds the loss component in the denominator of equation (10) by a 
relatively large margin for all funds. 
Considering the WG (within group) rankings, the Sharpe and Jensen rankings are 
extremely similar:  for the AllShare group, their rankings of funds differ by more than 3 
places for only 3 funds out of 19 and for the SmallCap group differ by more than 3 
places for only 1 fund out of 23.  If we consider the three measures which specifically 
take account of the downside – the Sortino ratio, higher moment measure (HM)  and 
LAPS – we can also consider which, if any, of these gives a rank which is more than 3 
places different from the other two. The result is that the HM differs from the other two 
measures in its ranking of the AllShare Group by more than 3 places in 11 out of 19 
cases and in its ranking of the SmallCap Group by more than 3 places in 10 out of 23 
cases.  In fact the rankings with the HM measure are closely related to the rankings by 
the Sharpe and Jensen measures, which is not surprising because the HM is an extension 
of the CAPM on which the other two measures are based.  So our first conclusion is that 
the Sharpe, Jensen and HM measures behave similarly, and that the Sortino and LAPS 
measures are also closely related.  
                                                 
11 These values are suggested by Hwang and Satchell (2005). We also considered a variety of other 
parameters, but the results were not much changed. 
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If we look at individual funds in the SmallCap group, Candover, Northern Investors, 
and Pantheon Intl. funds are ranked lower with the LAPS than by the Sharpe ratio, 
Jensen’s alpha, the Sortino ratio and the HM measure, which is because they are 
relatively less positively skewed in tracking errors than in returns. On the other hand, 
funds such as Perpetual UK, whose tracking errors are relatively more positively 
skewed and less leptokurtic, are ranked higher with the LAPS than with the conventional 
measures.  This result shows that LAPS is more sensitive to higher moments than the 
other measures, even when compared with the “higher moment” HM measure. 
Although the Sortino ratio shows rankings which are similar to those of the LAPS in the 
SmallCap group,  in the AllShare group its rankings of Glasgow Income, Welsh 
Industrial, Lowland, and Edinburgh UK Tracker are quite different from those of LAPS .   
So the second conclusion is that the two downside measures – Sortino and LAPS – are 
not empirically equivalent. 
 
3.3  Time-Varying Properties of Loss Aversion Performance Measures 
So far we have examined average rankings over all 108 months of data.  It would be 
possible for two performance measures to give the same average rankings but to differ 
considerably in their time-series behaviour.  Therefore we now use twelve individual 
monthly observations to produce a time-series of annual measures of performance.  We 
also need to use time-series if we are going to compute LAPH and LAPEW, which take 
account of the previous year’s losses or gains in order to allow for the house-money 
effect.   Using this approach, we obtain a time series for each performance measure for 
each fund that consists of 9 annual observations from 1994 to 2002.  (For the LAPH and 
LAPEW, only eight annual measures can be calculated since we require the previous 
year’s gains and losses in their computation.)  For the LAPH, we set the values of 
30 =β  and 151 =β , so that in 95% of cases the values of tλ  range from 1.5 to 4.5 
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depending on 1−tTE .
12  For LAEW we choose 100 =ψ  and 1001 =ψ , so that the values of 
)exp( 1−− ttTEρ  range from 1.1 to 4.4 in 95% of cases.13 
Table 3 reports the average cross-sectional rank-correlation coefficients between the 
seven performance measures over the nine years, based on the whole sample of 42 
funds.14  The first result is that the three LAP measures are very closely related 
(correlations of 0.96 or higher), so that taking account of the house-money effect, which 
is included within LAPH and LAPEW, does not seem to matter for these funds. The 
second result is that the LAP measures are related more closely to Jensen’s alpha than to 
the others – the correlation of the alpha and LAPS is 0.751.  This contrasts with a lower 
correlation of the Sharpe ratio with LAPS, which is 0.591.  Jensen’s alpha is also closely 
related to the HM measure (correlation of 0.674).  Although Jensen’s alpha does not 
take account of asymmetry in the distribution of returns, it is apparent from the table 
that asymmetry is only of second-order importance in the fund rankings over time.  
Finally, despite the fact that the Sortino ratio and the LAP measures are concerned with 
downside risk, the Sortino ratio does not show a stronger relationship with the LAP 
measures than it does with the three traditional measures.  
Table 3 Rank Correlation Coefficients between Performance Measures 
Loss Aversion Performance Measure 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
Jesen's 
Alpha 
Sortino 
Ratio 
Higher 
Moment
LAPS 
(v1=0.75, 
v2=0.95) 
LAPH  
(v1=0.75, 
v2=0.95, β0=3, 
β1=15) 
LAPEW 
(ψ0=10, 
ψ1=100) 
Sharpe Ratio 1.000 0.719 0.680 0.446 0.560 0.592 0.562 
Jesen's Alpha  1.000 0.392 0.674 0.707 0.751 0.742 
Sortino Ratio   1.000 0.204 0.621 0.605 0.578 
Higher Moment    1.000 0.478 0.492 0.517 
                                                 
12 We use 30 =β  so that 3)( ≈tE λ  since 0)( 1 ≈−tTEE . We set 151 =β  after trying several different 
values for 1β  from 3 to 30. When 101 =β  and the standard deviation of 1−tTE  is 0.05, the values of 
11 −tTEβ  range from –1.5 to 1.5 in 95% of cases. 
13 When 100 =ψ  and 1001 =ψ , we have 10)( ≈tE ρ  since 0)( 1 ≈−tTEE .  In 95% of cases tρ  belongs 
to the range between 5 and 15 when the standard deviation of tTE  is 0.05. For the LAPH and LAPEW we 
have tried several different parameter values, but our results do not show significant differences. For the 
curvature parameters of the LAPH , we have used v1=0.75 and v2=0.95 as suggested by Hwang and 
Satchell (2005). 
14 We also did the analysis separately for the AllShare and SmallCap groups, but the results were not 
qualitatively different from those for the pooled sample. 
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LAPM v1=0.75, 
v2=0.95 
    1.000 0.997 0.969 
LAPH  (v1=0.75, 
v2=0.95, β0=3, 
β1=15) 
     1.000 0.966 Loss 
Aversion 
Performance 
Measure EWLAP (ψ0=10, 
ψ1=100) 
      1.000 
Rank Autocorrelation with Lag 
1  
-0.106 0.032 -0.218 0.053 -0.040 -0.048 -0.042 
Note: The performance measures are calculated annually using 12 monthly returns. Rank cross-
correlations between measures are then calculated each year using all 42 investment trusts, and then these 
correlation coefficients have been averaged over the 9 year period. The bold numbers represent 
significant at the 5% level. 
 
Figure 3 plots each of the performance measures for six of the individual funds over the 
sample period. There is considerable variation over time with respect to which fund 
performs best, regardless of which measure of performance is used.  Clearly the 
performance of these particular funds is not persistent and that is also indicated by the 
low rank-autocorrelations in the final row of Table 3.   
Another feature which can be seen in Figure 3 is that the different performance 
measures do not behave the same in rising and falling markets.  After the market fall of 
2000, the Sharpe and Jensen measures become more dispersed across funds, whereas 
the Sortino measure becomes compressed and is similar for all six funds.  By contrast, 
the LAP measures are largely unaffected by these market movements.   Because they 
include lagged returns, the LAPH and LAPW measures are also more stable than the 
LAPS that depends only on the last 12 months of data. 
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Figure 3  Performance Measures for Six Representative Funds over Time 
Figure 3A  Sharpe Ratio
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Figure 3B  Jensen's Alpha (multiplied by 100)
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Figure 3C  Sortino Ratio
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Figure 3D  Loss Aversion Performance M easure (LAPS)
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Figure 3E  Loss Aversion Performance M easure with House M oney Effects 
(LAPH)
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Figure 3F  Exponentially W eighted Loss Aversion Performance M easure 
(LAPEW)
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Finally in relation to Figure 3, the three LAP measures pick out City of London as a 
good performer in 1998, 2001, and 2002, but not in other periods, while the other 
conventional measures do not show City of London as a good performer at all. This is 
an example of how one fund could be preferred to the others if investors are loss-averse.  
 
3.4 Do the Performance Measures Correlate with the Desired Moments of 
the Distribution?  
From an investor’s viewpoint, “good performance” is related positively to the mean and 
skewness and negatively related to the variance and kurtosis.  Investors like larger first 
and third moments of the distribution (mean and skewness), while they dislike larger 
second and fourth moments of the distribution (variance and kurtosis) since these are 
measures of dispersion (risk). In Table 4 we report rank correlations between the 
performance measures and these moments of the distribution, both for NAV returns and 
for tracking errors. 
Starting with the NAV performance in Panel A of Table 4, note first that we only give 
results for the four traditional measures (Sharpe, Jensen, Sortino, HM) because the LAP 
measures are only relevant for tracking errors.  All four traditional measures are 
positively correlated with the mean and negatively correlated with the standard 
deviation, with the exception of  the Sortino ratio. Jensen’s alpha is the only measure to 
give a significantly positive correlation with skewness, and no measure gives a negative 
correlation with kurtosis. In fact the measures are positively related to kurtosis. 
Turning to tracking-error performance in Panel B of Table 4, all of the correlations with 
the mean are again positive and significant.  However, none of the correlations with the 
standard deviation are significantly negative except the LAPS; the Sharpe ratio and 
Jensen’s alpha even show significantly positive correlations with standard deviations. 
None of the skewness correlations are significant except for the LAPEW , which shows a 
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negative relationship with the skewness of tracking errors.15 Only the LAP measures 
give significant negative correlations with kurtosis. 
The results in Table 4, Panel  B, tend to support the loss-aversion (LAP) measures.  If 
tracking errors matter, then one of the LAP measures may be preferred by an investor 
because they are positively related with the level of tracking errors, and negatively 
related to volatility and kurtosis of tracking errors.  
 
Table 4  Rank Correlation Coefficients between Performance Measures and NAV 
Log-returns and Tracking Errors 
A. Cross-sectional Rank Correlation Coefficients between Performance Measures and the First 
Four Moments of NAV log-returns 
The First Four 
Moments of NAV 
Log-returns 
Sharpe Ratio Jesen's Alpha Sortino Ratio Higher Moment  
Mean 0.856 0.649 0.807 0.395 
Std. Dev. -0.161 -0.139 0.053 -0.112 
Skewness 0.027 0.209 -0.083 -0.199 
Kurtosis 0.160 0.164 0.110 0.175 
B. Cross-sectional Rank Correlation Coefficients between Performance Measures and the First 
Four Moments of Tracking Errors 
Loss Aversion Performance Measure 
The First Four 
Moments of 
Tracking Errors 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
Jesen's 
Alpha 
Sortino 
Ratio 
Higher 
Moment 
LAPS 
(v1=0.75, 
v2=0.95) 
LAPH  
(v1=0.75, 
v2=0.95, β0=3, 
β1=15) 
LAPEW 
(ψ0=10, 
ψ1=100) 
Mean 0.626 0.746 0.641 0.484 0.898 0.903 0.879 
Std. Dev. 0.111 0.224 -0.038 0.091 -0.128 -0.069 0.017 
Skewness -0.054 0.024 0.013 -0.077 -0.061 -0.013 -0.107 
Kurtosis -0.089 -0.083 -0.027 -0.058 -0.151 -0.135 -0.146 
Notes: All loss aversion performance measures and NAV and TEs statistics are non-normal with Jarque-
bera statistics at 5% significance level and thus we calculate correlation coefficients based on ranks of the 
measures and the first four moments of NAV returns and tracking errors. The results are calculated by 
averaging 9 years cross-sectional rank correlations between performance measures and the four moments 
of NAV returns and tracking errors from May 1993 to April 2002 for 42 closed-end funds. The bold 
numbers represent significance at the 5% level. 
 
 
                                                 
15 The negative relationship between the LAPEW and the skewness of tracking errors however does not 
suggest inappropriateness of the measure since the LAPEW is influenced by the previous years tracking 
errors. 
 32
4  The Closed-End-Fund Puzzle and Performance Measures 
The main puzzle related to closed-end funds is that they trade at a discount to their net-
asset values.  This has already been noted for our sample in the final column of Table 1.  
The puzzle has been investigated by many authors and suggested reasons for its 
existence include management fees, tax liabilities, illiquid assets, past performance, 
agency problems, tax inefficiency, and market segmentation.16  The failure of 
explanations based on efficient markets and rationality has led to a behavioural 
explanation, that the discount reflects the (irrational) sentiment of investors who are 
able to move prices within a wide channel because of limited arbitrage.17 
Figure 4A plots the average discounts of all UK closed-end funds over our sample 
period, together with the average discounts for the two sample groups (AllShare and 
SmallCap).  There is an upward trend in the discount over the period, with the SmallCap 
discount always larger than that for the AllShare group, possibly reflecting the greater 
costs in replicating a portfolio of small-firm shares. 
One way to consider the discount is that it is equal to one minus the familiar market-to-
book ratio. If investors are happy with a fund’s performance, they raise the market-to-
book ratio and, for a closed-end fund, this is reflected in a smaller discount.  The 
relevance of this to the present study is that “performance is in the eye of the beholder”.  
If one performance measure is more reflective of investor preferences than another, then 
funds which perform well according to this measure should also have smaller discounts.  
That is the hypothesis which we are going to test.  
                                                 
16 See Dimson and Minio-Kozerski (1999) for a literature survey on closed-end funds. 
17 See Zweig (1973), De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990) and Lee, Shleifer and Thaler 
(1991) among others for early studies on the discount from the behavioural finance point of view.  A 
more recent study by Gemmill and Thomas (2002) attributes changes in the discount to swings in 
sentiment, but the presence of a discount to management fees and limited arbitrage. 
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Figure 4  Investment Trusts Discounts and Performance Measures 
Figure 4A  Investment Trust Discounts
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In Panel A of Table 5 we examine whether discounts relate to the moments of the return 
distributions  (either log returns or tracking errors) and in Panel B of Table 5 we 
examine whether discounts relate to each of the performance measures.  All of the 
results in the table are based on annual rankings and correlations, so each number in the 
table is an average for the 9 years of results (or 8 years for LAPH and LAPEW , which 
require a one-year lag). 
In Panel A the cross-sectional rank correlation coefficients between the discounts of the 
42 closed-end funds and the first four moments of returns (i.e., mean, standard deviation, 
skewness and kurtosis) are given.  This is done both for NAV returns (upper half of 
Panel  A) and for tracking errors (lower half of Panel  A).  Few of the correlations are 
significant at the 5% level.  We would expect the discounts to be smaller for funds 
which have higher NAV returns and this is supported by the negative values in the first 
row, but these are not statistically significant. Where there are significant correlations in 
Panel  A, they suggest that discounts are larger: (i) for those AllShare funds which have 
high kurtosis; (ii) for those SmallCap funds which have a large standard deviation for 
their tracking errors. 
Figure 4B plots the rank correlations between the performance measures and discounts 
year-by-year.  A negative correlation would indicate that discounts are smaller when 
performance is good, but there is no clear “winner” in the contest to see which measure 
has the highest negative correlation. Measures which are worst in some periods are best 
in others.  Panel B of Table 5 averages the annual data plotted in Figure 4B and 
confirms that discounts are not related to any of the performance measures: none of the 
correlations are significant.  We hypothesised that the LAP measures would relate more 
closely to the discount than would the traditional measures, because investors exhibit 
loss-aversion, but we are not able to show that.  The results do not support arguments 
that the discount is related to simple measures of past performance.  Nevertheless, it 
remains possible that there is some more complicated relationship between past 
performance and discounts (see, for example,  Chay and Trzcinka, 1999) which we have 
not properly specified, or that it reflects investors’ views about future performance. 
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Table 5  Cross-sectional Rank Correlation Coefficients between Closed-end Fund 
Discounts and Various Statistics and Performance Measures 
A. Rank Correlation between Discounts and the First Four Moments of NAV Log-returns and 
Tracking Errors 
    
All 42 Closed-
end Funds 
19 AllShare 
Funds 
23 SmallCap 
Funds 
NAV Log-returns -0.065 -0.044 -0.049 
Standard Deviation 
of NAV Log-returns 0.107 0.035 0.006 
Skewness of NAV 
Log-returns 0.075 -0.082 -0.009 
Correlation 
between Discounts 
and the First Four 
Moments of NAV 
Log-returns Kurtosis of NAV 
Log-returns 0.043 0.188 0.044 
Tracking Errors 0.018 -0.044 -0.049 
Standard Deviation 
of Tracking Errors 0.291 0.070 0.163 
Skewness of 
Tracking Errors -0.032 0.054 0.008 
Correlation 
between Discounts 
and the First Four 
Moments of 
Tracking Errors Kurtosis of Tracking 
Errors -0.017 -0.001 0.001 
B. Rank Correlation between Discounts and Performance Measures 
  All 42 Closed-end Funds 
Sharpe Ratio -0.028 
Jesen's Alpha 0.029 
Sortino Ratio -0.096 
HM Measure -0.029 
LAPS, v1=0.75, v2=0.95 -0.026 
LAPH, v1=0.75, v2=0.95 -0.006 
LAPEW 0.035 
Notes: The table is calculated with ranks on the NAV log-returns, tracking errors, and discounts for the 42 
closed-end funds. Each year we calculate correlation coefficients based on ranks of the discounts and the 
first four moments of NAV returns and tracking errors. The results are calculated by averaging these 9 
years cross-sectional rank correlations. The bold numbers represent significance at the 5% level. 
 
5  Conclusions 
In this paper we have developed three loss-aversion measures of portfolio performance 
which are consistent with the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979).  The 
simplest of these measures is closely-related to the Sortino ratio and the Omega measure 
of Keating and Shadwick (2002).  The other two take account of the house-money effect, 
which implies more risk-taking by investors who have had recent successes.  These 
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loss-aversion-performance measures have great intuitive appeal, since they just compare 
weighted expected gains relative to weighted expected losses.  They can also be 
interpreted as the value of an upside call option relative to a downside put option, with 
the benchmark return as the exercise price.  
Performance measures are practical tools for investors.  Two questions can be asked in 
relation to our new measures.  The first is whether the new measures attribute different 
performance to funds than do traditional measures?  The second is, even if there is a 
difference between the new measures and the old measures, do investors care about it?  
We use a sample of 42 closed-end funds observed monthly over the ten-year period, 
March 1993 to April 2002,  to address these questions.   
With respect to the first question, the loss-aversion measures do show different 
performance, particularly as they are applied to tracking errors and not to portfolio 
returns.  They are positively related in cross-section to (positive) tracking errors, but 
negatively related to the volatility and kurtosis of such errors.  The other measures do 
not behave in this way and are therefore less appropriate if the user is loss-averse.  With 
respect to the second question, experimental evidence suggests that loss-aversion is 
important in many situations, but there is no evidence from the behaviour of discounts 
on the closed-end funds in our sample to suggest that investors bid-up the prices of 
funds which score well by any performance measure.  Either our sample is too small, or 
loss-aversion does not matter, or investors are not basing their expectations of future 
performance on the recent past.  
In sum, it is possible to estimate loss-aversion performance for funds and the measures 
are intuitively appealing and have theoretical support from prospect theory.  However, it 
is not clear from our empirical analysis that investors do actually exhibit loss-aversion.  
More empirical studies of whether investors distinguish between funds on the basis of 
loss-aversion would be very helpful.  
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